Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and

Members of the Committee. I thank you for giving me the opportunity

to testify on our Sudan policy and I also thank you for your

resolve and commitment on trying to push for a better Sudan, a

Sudan that will be peaceful and prosperous for all of its people.

Today I would like to review with you the United States strategy

to push for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

and to resolve the crisis in Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would request that my

written testimony be placed in the record and I will highlight the

main points of the Administration’s Sudan policy this afternoon.

Thank you. First, the Administration’s primary

goal is a peaceful and democratic Sudan that contributes to

regional development and cooperates on counterterrorism.

Over the past 5 years, we have made steady progress toward this

goal. Mr. Chairman, you specifically asked: Are we losing ground

on peace in Sudan? The answer is as challenging and complex as

the country itself.

On the North/South peace front, we have clearly gained ground.

On Darfur, it is back and sometimes forth, but mainly back, but

we do have a plan for progress there. We also have to be watchful

and take preventative measures to not lose ground in the East.

First, Mr. Chairman, let me outline where we are today and why

I say we have made progress toward our overall goal over the past

5 years.

On January 22, 2001, President Bush told his then National Security

Advisor, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, that we must end the war in

Sudan and stop the humanitarian and human rights abuses in the

South.

As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the National Congress Party

that controlled the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement were bitter enemies that had warred for over

22 years.

As Congressman Payne said, 4 million people were displaced, 2

million died in that bitter conflict. Yet as a result of active United

States diplomacy, working closely with Kenya, IGAD, and other

international partners, the SPLM and Khartoum Government

signed the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9,

2005, in Nairobi, Kenya.

The United States led international efforts to achieve that success

and the Bush Administration remains committed to its full implementation.

We witnessed, on July 9, 2005, the installation of the Chairman

of the SPLM, the late Dr. John Garang, as First Vice President of

Sudan and Khartoum.

Since then, members of the SPLM, the NCP, and other parties

have formed the Government of National Unity in Khartoum and

SPLM, under the new First Vice President of the Government of

National Unity, Salva Kiir, have set up the Government of Southern

Sudan in Juba.

I would just say that, as you know, the First Vice President

Salva Kiir is here on his first international trip and he has had a

chance to meet today with Vice President Cheney, with Secretary

Rice, with Deputy Secretary Zoellick, and myself. So some of the

testimony that I will state is based on our direct consultations with

the First Vice President.

These historic changes are major steps forward, but clearly there

is more for the parties to do. I know that you, Mr. Chairman, and

Members of this Committee, as well as the Administration, remain

concerned that many of the national commissions called for in the

CPA still must be stood up, troop withdrawals are behind schedule,

demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration needs to move forward.

These are just three areas to cite that are of particular importance.

Still and most significantly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

passed its first major test, the tragic death of its key architect,

the First Vice President Dr. John Garang.

Dr. Garang was committed to the cause of a peaceful, prosperous

and united Sudan. While his death is a great loss, there is every

reason to hope that his vision of a peaceful, democratic and unified

Sudan will be fulfilled.

Demonstrating the resilience of the CPA, Garang’s successor,

Salva Kiir, was inaugurated as First Vice President in an orderly

process and he has stated his unwavering commitment to realizing

Dr. Garang’s vision.

In addition, Dr. Garang’s widow, Rebecca, is carrying forward

her husband’s vision and is now serving as a Minister of Transport

and Roads in the Government of Southern Sudan.

Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Zoellick just had a phone call with

Vice President Taha to talk about the implementation of this Comprehensive

Agreement and he confirmed that the Assessment and

Evaluation Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, as

well as the Boundary Commission have now been formed by decree

issued by President Bashir.

Vice President Kiir told us this morning that he had expected the

announcements today, since when he left Sudan, the membership

of the commissions were already agreed upon and it was a matter

of making the announcement. So there has been some progress and

we welcome this news of the establishment of these key commissions.

As far as the Administration is concerned, the next critical steps

are for both parties to honor the security commitments, particularly

by forming a joint defense board, setting up the joint integrated

units and, as I mentioned, withdrawing the troops, particularly

the government troops, from the South and from Juba.

Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize a fundamental premise of our

Sudan strategy to maintain peace momentum. The Administration

views implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and

resolution of the Darfur crisis as interrelated issues.

Implementation of the CPA is crucial to ending the violence in

Darfur. Moreover, without progress in Darfur, there is a real danger

for the violence to spill over into other areas of Sudan.

The bottom line is the CPA is applicable in many respects to all

areas of Sudan and is designed to share power and wealth between

a center a periphery areas, a key root of the conflict in all parts

of Sudan. It serves as a framework for other political agreements,

including in Darfur.

To get to Darfur, clearly it is an unacceptable situation that

must end now. Darfur is complex. It is a difficult situation that we,

the Administration and Congress, have characterized as involving

genocide.

The people of the United States know that this Administration,

under the direction of President Bush, Secretary Powell, and now

Secretary Rice has been the global leader in efforts to end the violence

and suffering in Darfur.

President Bush was the first head of state to speak out publicly

on the unfolding violence and atrocities in Darfur in 2004. The

United States was the first country to call for action in the United

Nations Security Council.

We were instrumental in obtaining a cease-fire agreement between

the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels, the Sudan

Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, in

April 2004.

The United States was also the first to emphasize a need for

intervention to stem the violence and as a result of our actions, the

African Union agreed to deploy observers and troops to Darfur in

August 2004.

Since that time, the United States has worked closely with the

African Union to build 32 base camps and with other donors provided

airlift for over 6,900 African Union personnel now deployed

to Darfur. This was possible with the over $160 million in resources

provided by the Congress.

President Bush continues to be committed to ending the conflict

in Darfur and the effort that the United States has mounted with

the international community has yielded results in Darfur.

As a result of the African Union’s intervention and pressure exerted

on the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels, the AUled

political talks are moving ahead in Abuja; large-scale, organized

violence has substantially diminished since early 2005; and mortality

rates have dropped.

That said, the situation in Darfur remains intolerable. Over 2.4

million people are living in camps for internally displaced persons.

Another 200,000 have sought refuge in neighboring Chad. Violence

continues to plague civilian populations, as we see in the current

spike of violence, caused by banditry, actions initiated by rebel

movements, actions by the government forces, and continued marauding

by the Janjaweed militia.

We continue to make categorically clear the responsibility of the

Government of Sudan, now the Government of National Unity, that

it must end support to the Janjaweed and work actively to stop its

actions while ensuring discipline within the Government of National

Unity’s own forces.

But the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that a political solution is

needed to end the violence in Darfur. We are trying to take actions.

The way ahead in Darfur is to continue to make clear to the Government

of Sudan its responsibility to insist that all sides respect

the cease-fire and to work with regional countries, Libya, Chad,

Eritrea and others to try to continue to put pressure on the rebels

to respect a cease-fire and to negotiate a political solution.

In that regard, Deputy Secretary Zoellick will be leading a mission

next week to Kenya and to Sudan to advance the Administration’s

efforts to restore peace to Darfur and set the groundwork for

a lasting political settlement in Abuja.

He is going to, in those Nairobi talks, bring the SLM leadership

together so that they can form a united front in their negotiations

with the Government of National Unity, making it clear to the

Government of Sudan its responsibility, insisting on accountability

of all sides to the cease-fire, pushing for the political solution in the

talks to Darfur.

We also are pushing the Government of National Unity to have

a joint negotiating team at Abuja and, in my consultations and the

Administration’s consultations with the First Vice President, Salva

Kiir, he told us that the Government of National Unity has established

a High-Level Committee on Darfur, which will be headed by

Bashir, and which will also have First Vice President Kiir, Second

Vice President Taha and other Cabinet ministers as the joint team

that will then go to Darfur to negotiate with SLM and JEM.

So we will continue to support the AU-led Abuja talks. We have

sent a U.S. senior official as an observer. We have also provided

technical expertise to assist the mediator.

Then finally, our approach to Darfur is to strengthen the African

Union mission there. We wish to strengthen its capability, for example,

with the delivery of the 105 Canadian armored personnel

carriers.

We are also pushing to increase NATO training and advice. We

are trying to ensure a consistent understanding by the AU forces

of their mandate, continuing to look at UN logistical assistance and

perhaps even bringing the AU mission in Darfur under the UN

peacekeeping to strengthen the security environment.

Finally, we are continuing to provide humanitarian assistance in

Darfur and in Southern Sudan. In Fiscal Year 2005, we provided

over $650 million, mostly in humanitarian assistance and support

to the African Union mission and over $450 million in reconstruction

and humanitarian assistance to other areas in Sudan, including

Southern Sudan in the three transition areas, Nuba Mountains,

Southern Blue Nile and Abyei.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the U.S.G. continues its strong support

for the South and we will help the Government of Southern Sudan

to build the institutions, capacity, transparency and infrastructure

necessary for it to function.

We believe that the institutions in Sudan have changed substantially

over the past 10 months, since the signing of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement, which has led to the new interim National

Constitution, the formation of the new Government of National

Unity in Khartoum, and the new Government of Southern Sudan.

We have to keep working with the SPLM to develop the new governmental

institutions, both in the South and in the North. We will

continue to work with international partners to support the commissions

and other integrative programs designed to facilitate the

peaceful transition to Dr. Garang’s vision of a united or unified

government.

Congress and the Administration share an interest in keeping

the pressure on the central government, but also in supporting the

new Government of Southern Sudan. We need to consult with Congress

about how existing legal authorities may need to be modified

so we can reinforce the SPLM, while maintaining and increasing

pressure on the North.

I hope that I can work with you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee

so we can move effectively to address the challenges and opportunities

of the peace agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the United States is on the right track.

Our strategy is moving forward. With the strong support of the

President and the Secretary and the Congress, we believe we have

the tools in place to maintain momentum, to influence the parties

and to achieve our common goal of a peaceful Sudan.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Frazer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF STATE FOR BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee thank you for giving me the opportunity

to testify on our Sudan policy. Today I will review with you the U.S. strategy

to maintain momentum on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA) and resolve the crisis in Darfur. Our primary goal is a peaceful, democratic

Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counter-terrorism.

Sudan is a challenging and complicated country and over the past 5 years

we have made steady progress toward that goal. You ask: Are we losing ground on

peace in Sudan? The answer is as complex as the country itself. On the North-South

peace front we have clearly gained ground. On Darfur its back and forth, but we

have a plan for progress. We also have to be watchful and take preventative measures

to not lose ground in the East.

First, Mr. Chairman, let me outline where we are today. The National Congress

Party-controlled (NCP) Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement (SPLM), bitter enemies that had warred for over 22 years, signed an historic

Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. The

United States led international efforts to achieve that success, and is committed to

its full implementation. We witnessed on July 9, 2005, the installation of the Chair-

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man of the SPLM, the late Dr. John Garang, as First Vice President of Sudan in

Khartoum. Since then, members of the SPLM, the NCP, and other parties have

formed a Government of National Unity in Khartoum and the SPLM and other parties

a Government of Southern Sudan in Juba. These historic changes are major

steps forward, but there is more for the parties to do. Many of the national commissions

called for in the CPA still must be stood-up, troop withdrawals are behind

schedule, and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration needs to move forward,

to cite three areas of particular importance.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement passed its first major test, the tragic death

of its key architect, First Vice President John Garang. Garang was committed to the

cause of a peaceful, prosperous, and united Sudan. While his death is a great loss,

there is every reason to hope that his vision of a peaceful, democratic, and unified

Sudan will be fulfilled. Demonstrating the resilience of the CPA, Garang’s successor,

Salva Kiir, was inaugurated as First Vice President in an orderly process, and he

has stated his unwavering commitment to realizing Garang’s vision. In addition,

Garang’s widow, Rebecca, is carrying forward her husband’s vision and is now serving

as the Minister of Transport and Roads in the Government of Southern Sudan

(GOSS).

Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize a fundamental premise of our strategy: implementation

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolution of the Darfur crisis

are interrelated issues. Implementation of the CPA is crucial to ending the violence

in Darfur. Moreover, without progress in Darfur, there is a real danger for

the violence to spill over into other areas of Sudan. Bottom line, the CPA is applicable

in many respects to all areas of Sudan, and is designed to share power and

wealth between the center and the periphery areas, a key root of conflict in all parts

of Sudan. It serves as a framework for other political agreements, including in

Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, Darfur is a complex and difficult situation. We, the Administration

and Congress, have characterized it as involving genocide. We approach Darfur with

the utmost resolve. The people of the United States know that this Administration,

under the direction of President Bush, Secretary Powell and now Secretary Rice, has

been the global leader in efforts to end the violence and suffering in Darfur. President

Bush was the first head of state to speak out publicly on the unfolding violence

and atrocities in Darfur in 2004. The United States was the first country to call for

action in the United Nations Security Council. We were instrumental in obtaining

a ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels, the

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement

(JEM), in April 2004. The United States was also the first to emphasize the need

for intervention to stem the violence. As a result of our actions, the African Union

agreed to deploy observers and troops to Darfur in August 2004. Since that time,

the United States has worked closely with the African Union to build 32 base

camps, and with other donors, provided airlift for over 6,900 African Union personnel

now deployed to Darfur. This was possible with the over $160 million in resources

provided by Congress.

The effort the United States mounted with the international community has yielded

significant results in Darfur. As a result of the African Union’s intervention and

pressure exerted on the Government of Sudan and Darfur rebels, AU-led political

talks are moving ahead in Abuja, large-scale organized violence has substantially

diminished since early 2005, and mortality rates have dropped.

That said, the situation in Darfur remains intolerable. Over 2.4 million people are

living in camps for internally displaced persons, and another 200,000 have sought

refuge in neighboring Chad. Violence continues to plague civilian populations, as we

see in the current spike of violence, caused by banditry, actions initiated by rebel

movements, and actions by government forces, and continued marauding by the

Janjaweed. We continue to make categorically clear the responsibility of the Government

of Sudan—now the Government of National Unity—to both end support to the

Janjaweed and work actively to stop its actions while ensuring discipline within the

Government of National Unity’s own forces.

Mr. Chairman, we must react to this spike in violence by pushing harder for full

implementation of the CPA and insisting that all sides respect the ceasefire. Deputy

Secretary Zoellick is leading a mission to Kenya and Sudan next week to advance

the Administration’s efforts to restore peace to Darfur and set the groundwork to

achieve a lasting political settlement in Abuja. Because President Bush and Secretary

Rice consider Sudan a high priority, the Deputy Secretary has visited Sudan

three times since April. He has traveled to Khartoum, Darfur, and the South. Secretary

Rice visited in July. I just returned from my first visit to Khartoum and Juba

as Assistant Secretary.

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Mr. Chairman, to implement our Sudan strategy, we are focusing on the following

steps:

Pushing the new Government of National Unity to ensure implementation of

the CPA, including preparing the parties to stand up national commissions,

form other key mechanisms, and honor their security commitments to form

the Joint Defense Board, setup Joint Integrated Units, and withdraw Northern

troops from the South.

Actions to stop the violence and reach a political settlement in Darfur, including

strengthening AMIS and pushing for the provision of 105 Canadian Armored

Personnel Carriers, increased NATO training and advice, consistent

understanding of the AMIS mandate, and UN logistical assistance and/or a

blue-hat, and sponsoring a Nairobi conference for SLM unity.

Strong support for the Government of Southern Sudan by helping to build the

institutions, capacity, transparency, and infrastructure necessary for it to

function. Including, moving forward with a limited program within existing

authorities to help transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into

a professional armed force, focused initially on refurbishing command and

training facilities. First Vice President Salva Kiir is also visiting Washington

today for meetings with senior officials and consultations on Capitol Hill.

Provision of humanitarian assistance in Darfur and Southern Sudan. In FY

2005, we provided over $650 million mostly in humanitarian assistance and

support to the African Union Mission, and over $450 million in reconstruction

and humanitarian assistance to other areas in Sudan, including Southern

Sudan and the three transition areas (Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile,

and Abyei). Support for the return of those displaced from Southern Sudan.

Mr. Chairman, institutions in Sudan have changed substantially over the past ten

months, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) led to a

new interim national constitution, the formation of a new Government of National

Unity in Khartoum, and a new entity in the South, the Government of Southern

Sudan (GOSS). We have a strong interest in supporting the CPA, especially by

working with the SPLM to develop new governmental institutions in the South and

working with the Sudanese and international partners to support the commissions

and other integrated programs designed to facilitate the peaceful transition to a unified

government. For example, we want to consult with Congress about First VP

Kiir’s request that we allow U.S. companies to provide spare parts to rehabilitate

Sudan’s railways, to help facilitate the movement of humanitarian assistance and

reconstruction supplies into Southern Sudan.

Congress and the Administration share an interest in keeping the pressure on the

central government, but also in supporting the new Government of Southern Sudan.

We need to consult with Congress about how existing legal authorities may need

to be modified so we can reinforce the SPLM while maintaining or increasing pressure

on the north. I hope that I can work with you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee

so we can more effectively address the challenges and opportunities of the

peace agreement.

Mr. Chairman, let me shift to Darfur. Our support for the African Union is unequivocal.

We are one of the largest donors for the African Union Mission in Sudan, having

provided over $160 million thus far to build the African Union’s base

camps, maintain equipment, contribute to the airlift of troops, and provide

military observers.

We convened a donor meeting in Washington, DC October 18 to discuss ways

to further help the African Union.

We continue to press the Sudanese government to provide flight clearance for

all 105 of Canada’s Armored Personnel Carriers for the African Union troops.

We early on pressed for NATO support to the African Union. NATO continues

to play a key role in coordinating airlift of troops and providing capacitybuilding

training. We believe NATO can do more to strengthen AU capabilities.

Following the visit of Secretary Rice to Sudan in July, we launched an initiative

to combat violence against women in Darfur; as sexual violence continues

to be an acute problem. We believe the Sudanese government must do much

more to fulfill its commitments and we are determined to press them to take

specific actions to protect women, and will support the expansion and establishment

of women’s crisis centers in IDP camps in Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, the African Union’s expansion has clearly had a deterrent value.

The African Union has performed admirably in a terribly difficult situation. Largescale

organized violence has diminished and security has improved in areas where

they are deployed. Local AU sector commanders have negotiated agreements between

tribes to prevent violent flare-ups and are facilitating the delivery of humanitarian

assistance. At the same time, as the AU has expanded, logistics and above

battalion-level operational problems have become more apparent and funding gaps

more acute. We are working to identify additional funding for the African Union

mission to address these shortcomings. We will also accompany the joint AU/UN/

NATO/donors assessment mission scheduled for November, which will examine

ways donors can further assist the African Union. The provision of Canada’s Armored

Personnel Carriers and other efforts will enable the African Union to vigorously

carry out its broad mandate, which includes protection of civilians in imminent

danger.

Mr. Chairman, we are also looking toward the future of peacekeeping in Darfur.

We are beginning to discuss with the African Union how the UN can play a larger

role. While we do this, we must be mindful that the United Nations is not the silverbullet

answer to peace in Darfur. Thus far, the UN has been slow to deploy to

southern Sudan. The African Union has been the right force with the right mandate

and has been successful in stabilizing the security situation in Darfur. The AU mission

deserves our continued support even as we explore with our partners a possible

future role for the UN.

Mr. Chairman, the heart of the conflict in Darfur is political, and the addition of

more troops will not change that fact. As such, the United States strongly backs the

African Union-led peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. We have sent a senior U.S. official

as an observer and have provided technical experts to assist the mediation. We also

support its chief mediator Ambassador Salim Salim.

The talks have had modest success; the parties signed a Declaration of Principles

on July 5, 2005. The most recent round that ended on October 20, however, yielded

disappointing results. Divisions within the Sudan Liberation Movement are largely

responsible. We have made clear to the SLM leaders that they must resolve their

differences so that rapid progress can be made. As part of his upcoming trip to the

region, the Deputy Secretary will meet with the SLM leadership to insist that they

develop a unified approach, to make clear that we are prepared to intensify our contacts

with them if they respect the ceasefire and focus on negotiations, but to also

make clear that they will become irrelevant to the process and to the future of

Sudan if they do not.

Accountability is another part of our strategy. All parties in Darfur must be held

fully accountable for their actions. In the UNSC, we pressed for the adoption of resolution

1591, which provides for targeted sanctions (including a travel ban and asset

freeze) on individuals who meet certain criteria, such as committing atrocities. We

did not stand in the way of the adoption of resolution 1593, which referred the situation

in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. As Deputy Secretary Zoellick

has stated, ‘‘if people ask for our help, we will try to make sure that this gets pursued

fully. We do not want to see impunity for any of these actors.’’

Mr. Chairman, in order to maximize our leverage and to ensure cost-sharing to

support efforts on Darfur, we are coordinating closely with the European Union and

member states. We are also working intensively with key regional actors, including

Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, Kenya and Chad, among others to end the crisis in Darfur

and prevent an outbreak of violence in the East. As always, our humanitarian assistance

is part of an overall international effort.

Mr. Chairman, as the Deputy Secretary has said, there are two paths for Sudan:

an ‘‘upward spiral’’ or a ‘‘downward spiral.’’ The ‘‘upward spiral’’ is full CPA implementation,

a new and transformed Sudanese government, an effective African

Union role in Darfur and Abuja, and reconciliation in Darfur (and other areas) within

this political framework. The ‘‘downward spiral’’ is ongoing violence in Darfur

that spills into other areas and undermines the government and CPA implementation.

We have made clear to the parties that steps in our bilateral relationship will

only be taken in the U.S. interest, and only in response to actions on the CPA and

Darfur consistent with the ‘‘upward spiral.’’

Mr. Chairman, the United States is on the right track and our strategy is moving

forward with the strong support of President Bush and Secretary Rice. We believe

we have the tools in place to maintain momentum and influence the parties. We

thank the Congress for its strong interest in supporting our common goal of a peaceful

Sudan.

Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.

Chairman. Your first question was on the National Congress Party

and its domination of the Government of National Unity, particularly

of the key ministries. I think that was the perception, particularly

given that the National Congress Party received the finance

ministry and the energy ministry as well.

In our consultations with the SPLM, part of what we learned is

that some of their capable senior officials wanted to be ministers

in the Government of Southern Sudan and so didn’t put themselves

forward to be part of the Government of National Unity, because

the feeling is that there needs to be a very strong Government of

Southern Sudan.

So certainly we continue to have concerns and we will watch

carefully whether the Government of National Unity is dominated

by the National Congress Party and what type of influence the

SPLM ministers have in that government.

I had the opportunity to visit Sudan earlier in October and I actually

posed this question to a couple of the SPLM ministers to say,

do you have authority within your ministry?

What is the nature of all of these mini-advisors? Is there a shadow

government? I was assured that they do have the authority, but

I do think that clearly SPLM is the new member of this government

and the United States must continue in our effort to back

and to transform the nature of this regime, which is characterized

by many of the Members of this Committee appropriately. We must

work very closely with the SPLM and build their capacity. Continue

to assist them so that they can be an effective force within

the Government of National Unity, an effective transformative

force.

Certainly I think that the Vice President’s visit to the United

States, being the first country that he came to on an international

visit, suggests his understanding and continued appreciation of the

strong support of the United States for his role as the second senior

official in that Government of National Unity.

We need to continue to support the Government of Southern

Sudan to build their capacity, especially to help them with their development.

I went to Juba. I met with the First Vice President, Salva Kiir.

I met with senior SPLM officials. I had an opportunity to meet

with Rebecca Garang, who is now the Government of Southern Sudan’s

Minister of Transport.

This issue of spare parts did come up and they were saying that

because the Government of Sudan sent soldiers through the railways,

they had destroyed the rail capacity. Now they need development

to come through those same railways and they did raise the

question of the possibility of allowing for spare parts.

When I was in——

When I was in Juba, they spoke favorably

of it, but what I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, is that the First

Vice President is here himself and will have an opportunity to meet

with Members and that question can be posed directly to him.

But a couple of weeks ago, in my consultations with him in Juba,

they all spoke favorably for it.

But we need to look across the board at how we can help the

Government of Southern Sudan. It will also involve supporting the

reform of the security sector, professionalizing the SPLM and because

Sudan is, we have sanctions on them, many numerous sanctions

on them, we may need carve-outs to be able to do so.

But I think that Ambassador Zoellick, when he goes to Sudan,

will have a better opportunity to make an assessment of that and

then come back to Congress with some specific ways in which we

may need to look at authorities to provide the avenue for assisting

the Government of Southern Sudan, while maintaining the pressure

on the National Congress Party within the Government of National

Unity.

You asked the question, Mr. Chairman, about the trafficking,

and indeed the recommendation has gone forth that Sudan be put

on the tier 2 watch list, and the reason behind that was specifically

related to the sexual violence against women.

Secretary Rice, when she went to Darfur, she met with women

who had been abused and violated and she asked the Administration

to come up with an initiative to counter violence against

women and we sent that to the Government of Sudan.

They developed an action plan, which was a tailored work plan,

to address those issues. In particular, Sudan committed to implement

a plan to address sexual violence against women in Darfur

itself.

It also helped to assist with the repatriation of 100 Sudanese

children, camel jockeys from Qatar, and began an investigation in

trafficking of these children. And it was on the basis of those actions

that they were put on the watch list with the understanding

that they could always go back to tier 3 if we weren’t satisfied with

the actions being taken to implement the plan.

So that was the basis of the tier 2 watch list, but again, it is not

a permanent status. It can easily revert to tier 3.

Certainly.

Absolutely. You asked about the humanitarian

access. We still have concerns that the Government of

Sudan, namely the National Congress Party, is not allowing humanitarian

access.

Ambassador Zoellick raised this specifically in his conversation

with Vice President Taha this afternoon and got some assurances,

but you know assurances, words are one thing, action is another.

So we will continue to press the government to allow for that humanitarian

access.

On the accountability, as far as I know, Mr. Chairman, the ICC

list has not become public, but Ambassador Zoellick again has signaled

that if the ICC requires assistance, the United States stands

ready to assist. But they haven’t asked us for any assistance in developing

their list or getting the government to adhere to any ICC

charges.

I missed the very first part of your question

on the African Union.

Okay. Thank you. Yes. On Darfur, the

SLM, Meni Menawi is there, but Abdul Wahid is not at the SLM

conference.

We raised this question. I raised this question with the First Vice

President, Salva Kiir. He said that there may be some concerns in

terms of security of Abdul Wahid and that that is the reason that

the Nairobi conference will be so important, because it will be on

neutral ground and we expect both leaders to show up at the

Nairobi conference that the United States will be hosting.

It is critical that the SLM come together. They are providing an

excuse for the National Congress Party to not progress on the

peace front.

So without rebel unity, the negotiations won’t go anywhere. So

we are taking an active role to try to bring them together.

On the African Union, there is a financial shortfall, which is

partly the reason why we are looking at, over time, the possibility

of Blue Hatting them as a UN force. But certainly the United

States is looking to meet its shortfall, which is about $100 million.

The EU is also coming up with the money.

As far as the pay differential, it is my understanding that the

AU has rectified it.

Thank you. On your first question, Congressman

Payne, in terms of USAID and how it is going to organize

itself, there is a building being constructed in Juba and the

plan is to move the operations that are in Nairobi to Juba so that

we can more effectively support the Government of Southern

Sudan.

That support includes training, helping to build the capacity of

the SPLM officials, both in the assembly as well as in the executive,

the ministers themselves.

Also, we are trying to provide assistance with the budgetary

monitoring and transparency so that the oil revenue that they will

get, as well as the donor assistance, can be accounted for and used

for the people.

We are also trying to work with NDI and IRI and other institutions,

to try to help the SPLM become a political party, able to contest

elections over the future and support the Parliamentarians,

the assembly members with training.

So, yes, we are doing a whole range of activities to try to support

the Government of Southern Sudan. We think it is critical. That is

why the Administration is focused on Sudan in the first place.

Our interest stemmed from the grievances in the South, the

atrocities that were taking place in the South. So, it behooves us

to really put a focus on assisting them in establishing a peaceful

and prosperous Sudan and particularly Southern Sudan.

On the question of the funds, yes, I do look forward to working

with you to try to develop a strategy to get the type of funding and

assistance that will be necessary to fully support the peace process

in Sudan, and I will come back to discuss that directly with you

on how we might address any shortfalls in funding that we are facing.

Your question about the commissions is apt. Timing is everything

and I am certain that the First Vice President’s visit here

helped to get the announcement.

That said, when I visited Juba, the First Vice President told me

at that time that he had submitted the names of the SPLM ministers

who would be part of these new commissions. It was clear

that many of the commissions required Government of Southern

Sudan ministers. Until the Government of Southern Sudan was established,

the commissions could not go forward.

So I believe that it has been in the works, without a doubt, and

as I said, the First Vice President told us this morning that when

he left Sudan he expected the decree to have been already announced,

because he left it on Bashir’s desk to be done with everyone

having agreed on the composition of the commission.

I don’t doubt that the timing was intended for effect, but it does

represent, I think, considerable work, particularly considerable

work on the part of the Government of Southern Sudan and on

Vice President Kiir’s part.

Thank you. Yes, Ambassador Zoellick, Deputy

Secretary Zoellick has made very clear that if we were asked

by the ICC for our help, we would try to make sure that this gets

pursued fully, to use his words, because we don’t want to see impunity

for any of these actors. So they haven’t asked, but if they did,

we stand ready to assist.

On the question of the senior diplomat, no, it is not a matter of

normalizing relations. What we did was send Ambassador Hume

there. He was our former Ambassador to South Africa, as well as

the former Ambassador to Algiers. He speaks Arabic. He has extensive

expertise in conflict management. He worked in Mozambique.

He has been working at the UN.

What we wanted was a senior diplomat who could pursue U.S.

interests. And our interests are clear. Our interests are we need

someone that can put pressure on the National Congress Party to

end its support for the Janjaweed, to stop the violence in Darfur.

We need a senior person, who understands how the former Liberation

Movement, the SPLM, can be transformed into a Government

of Southern Sudan and he has the expertise across the board.

So our sending him there was in the United States’ interest. It

was in no way a signal of a normalization of relations and I think

that we are not trying to normalize relations with the Government

of Sudan or the Government of National Unity.

What we are trying to do is implement the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement so that we transform the very nature of that regime

and we need someone senior, with that mandate, who is able to engage

all parties to push for it on the areas that I outlined: Support

for the Government of Sudan, implementation of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement and ending the violence in Darfur, and creating

a broader prosperous and unified Sudan.

Thank you. Yes. The armored personnel

carriers have been held up by President Bashir. I think we can say

that it is President Bashir himself that is holding up those armored

personnel carriers.

What they have agreed to do is to let 35 come in. We are continuing

to push for all of the armored personnel carriers to be allowed

in to support the AU mission in Darfur. We are continuing

to pressure. Certainly this is something that Deputy Secretary

Zoellick will raise in his mission to Sudan next week. It is something

that I raised when I met with President Bashir, when I met

with Vice President Taha and other officials. We are continuing to

push on that front.

The question of Roger Winter, who is our special representative

to the Deputy Secretary, and how he will interface with Ambassador

Hume, who is our Charge´ now, the idea here is that the

Charge´ is there permanently in terms of he doesn’t go in and out.

He is a daily presence there and we can call him and say, ‘‘You

need to put pressure on these guys right now at this moment in

time.’’ And so he is sort of managing our operation and has a daily

presence there.

Roger Winter, as you said, has a long-time engagement in Sudan.

He has excellent contacts there. He has a good sense of what is actually

taking place. He will continue to be a senior advisor, especially

to the Deputy Secretary. He will continue to have an influence

and a role as an envoy going back and forth in and out. He

will continue to meet with SPLM and government officials as necessary.

He and I will work closely together in a formulation of our

Sudan policy. He will continue to meet with constituency groups

there and here.

So his role is one of more roving, whereas the Charge´ is a permanent

presence to try to keep the pressure on.

Yes. Thank you very much. The Kalma

camp issue also came up in Ambassador Zoellick’s phone call with

Vice President Taha and he emphasized again that that has to be

resolved. He got assurances. We will see. We know the character

of the regime.

I would also say that redeployment of the government troops

from Juba is necessary. It is an immediate necessary action that

they must take.

It is absolutely unacceptable for them to continue to have their

presence there. They are behind the schedule in redeployment. It

represents psychological warfare for them to continue to be there.

So I would push very strongly on the government and I know

that Ambassador Zoellick is going to do so. That those government

forces redeploy and get out of the South, because they are already

behind schedule. So that certainly is an area.

A second area that is important now, is that they established

this Boundary Commission. That is one of the announcements that

is made, but it is critical that that Boundary Commission’s work

be transparent and that we have oversight, because it establishes

the line for where the North and the South is and, as the First Vice

President has stated and others have stated, that line is creeping

southward so that they are capturing more area of the South,

claiming it to be North, particularly where there are oil fields and

that will have a major impact on revenue sharing.

So that is another area that we have to get immediate action and

have some very clear, very clear oversight. So those are two areas

and certainly to allow—there is at least 11,000 international NGO

workers in Sudan. They have to have free access. They have to be

allowed to do their work.

So that would be three areas that I am sure that Ambassador

Zoellick is going to continue to push on and I certainly will as well.

Thank you. Let me apologize for the lateness

of the testimony.

Yes. Certainly. You asked a very complex

and difficult question for me on how exactly the Janjaweed is operating.

I will answer it a few ways.

One, we clearly have seen in the past that the Janjaweed were

armed by the government. That the Government of Sudan—this is

before it became a Government of National Unity—did provide air

cover for their operations. So there was clear coordination between

the Janjaweed and the Government of Sudan, the National Congress

Party. What the First Vice President Salva Kiir has said, as

often happens, when you support an armed militia group, you can

lose control of them.

It is his view that the government has lost control of Janjaweed.

That is not to say that there was a recent—I know there was a recent

attack on a village in which there seemed to be some coordination

again.

Yes. A point very well taken. It is our understanding

that the AU actually has the mandate to protect civilians,

as well as themselves, but that different units don’t seem to

understand their mandate very well.

So partly we have to work with the AU to make sure that there

is communication and capacity and that there is a headquarters

element that can coordinate better the various units of the force

itself.

So that is where we are looking for NATO to potentially play a

role. We will work with the AU to try to get NATO to support the

headquarters capacity.

Yes.

Absolutely. On the question of the Sudanese

Government purchasing Chinese fighters, I will have to go

back and look into this.

This would be very concerning, as you said. We will look into it.

I will actually be going to Beijing at the end of this month and certainly

Sudan is on the agenda to be discussed, and we will raise

this. If in fact they are circumventing an arms embargo, that is a

very serious issue, but I actually don’t have the information that

you cited. So I have to——

Yes.

Yes. Thank you. I do know that USAID is

planning to work on reintegration and certainly that children soldiers

would be part of that reintegration. Let me see if I can find

some more specific information.

Congressman Watson, it looks like I am

going to have to come back to you with the specific plan that

USAID has for——

[continuing]. Integration of these children. I know

that that specifically is in the disarming, demobilization, reintegration.

They are going to focus on reintegration, but I don’t have in

front of me their specific plan for dealing with the children. I can

come back to you with that.

Thank you

Thank you. Congressman Watson, let me

just say that we do have experience with this in Liberia, where I

and Congressman Payne just were for the elections.

What we have done is we have actually taken many of those children

and given them the skills training to help rebuild the infrastructure

in Liberia, and I would imagine that USAID will work on

some of that type of skills training, but I certainly will come back

to you with a detailed plan.

Yes.

Sure.

Okay.

Thank you. On the mandate, the AU needs

to tell us if the mandate is not sufficient and they haven’t yet told

us that is the case.

As I said, it is a mandate that clearly states that they can protect

civilians and protect themselves from attack, but it is also

clear that there are certain units that don’t seem to understand

that mandate very clearly.

So part of this is communication. It may be that they need a

more robust mandate, but they need to carry out the one that they

have first and also, as I said, let us know. We are not opposed to

a more robust mandate or for a more robust mandate. We will follow

the lead of the forces in Darfur and try to make sure that they

have what they need, whether that be mandate as well as equipment,

training, and most importantly logistics in command and

control, because as you say, they have operated very well, particularly

at the battalion level.

They have done a fantastic job. They stepped up to the plate and

we should commend their effort and continue to support their area,

but when you start talking about brigade-level operations, they

need more support at the headquarters element. More planning

and more logistics to make sure they get the fuel that they need,

et cetera. So we are looking at how we can assist them.

This is not new to the Administration. We worked very much like

this with the ECOWAS force in Liberia, where we had a EUCOM

element embedded in their planning headquarters to assist with

that brigade-level operation, and it is also the case that it may be

that over time, particularly if we talk about increasing the troop

levels for the AU, that we may need to look at a Blue Hatter UN

force, because the AU may be tapped out in terms of its ability to

get new troop contributors, because frankly they are all over. They

are in Cote d’Ivoire. They are in Liberia. They are in Burundi.

They are stretched fairly thin. The countries that normally come

up and provide troops are fairly stretched. So it may be that we

need to look at a UN Blue Hatting.

But they have done very well and you know I think the African

Union is demonstrating the very philosophy of Africans taking control

of their own destiny and certainly they have stepped up in

Darfur.

There is no information that we have that Dr. Garang’s death

was anything but an accident. I think the investigation is going on,

but as far as the initial assessments, it was indeed a tragic, a very

tragic accident.

As far as the LRA is concerned, there has been an agreement between

this Government of Sudan and the Government of Uganda,

to allow for the Government of Uganda to have sort of quick action

in the Southern territory.

We believe that the SPLM will become an effective part of that

relationship, to try to address the LRA threat. The LRA is actually

starting to attack SPLM. So it is a very, very dangerous situation.

I think we have to take and do whatever we can to push the Government

of Sudan, because what we fear is that there may be ele-

ments within the military that continues to provide information to

the LRA and maybe even arms.

They may not represent Government of Sudan policy. That is a

question that is still out there, but there is certainly some type of

assistance we believe continuing with the LRA.

On the question of the lobbyist, the only thing that I can say

there is that one lobbyist cannot change the Administration’s approach

to Sudan.

We think that this is a regime that needs fundamental transformation.

That has been our approach from day one. As I said,

January 22, President Bush said that we need to change and stop

the killing that was taking place. That continues to apply in

Darfur.

This Administration is very serious about the challenges in

Sudan and where the responsibility lies in Sudan.

So certainly one lobbyist can’t change, in any way, advocating for

whomever, the fundamental approach of the Administration on

Sudan.

Okay. Yes. Thank you. Thank you very

much, Congressman. The other countries that are supporting the

rebels in Darfur, Chad, it may be ethnic- and tribal-based support.

Eritrea it is probably more strategic. Eritrea has had issues with

the character of the regime itself, just as the United States has had

trouble with the character of the regime, and so they may be supporting

various rebel forces to try to transform the nature of the

regime.

Our communications, at this moment, are

that the solution to Darfur and the solution to the East is negotiation.

That we have a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in place

that provides for the devolving of power from the center to the periphery,

that provides for power sharing, wealth sharing, and that

what we need to do is push the rebels to form a united front and

to negotiate so that they can become part of the Government of National

Unity, deliver benefits to their population, and help the

SPLM to transform the character of that regime as part of that

Government of National Unity.

This issue did come up earlier.

Thank you very much.

Yes. Thank you. On the question of H.R.

3127, clearly we support the spirit of the legislation and the need

for accountability for the perpetrators of violence and atrocities.

We will continue to watch to see how the bill comes out and we

are prepared to consult with you on it, but the spirit of it, certainly

we are with you on that.

On the donor conference, it was to strengthen the African Union

mission, particularly looking at funding over time, trying to build

international support to continue that funding and looking at the

future of Darfur peacekeeping.

Some of the issues that came up were: What is the mandate?

How do we support the mandate that is currently there? Do they

need a stronger mandate? What would be required if it were a

stronger mandate? How can you continue the funding in out years?

That was the purpose of the meeting.

Yes.

The only final comment is to thank you for

convening this hearing on Sudan. Again as I said, I thank you for

your commitment and resolve, Mr. Chairman, as well as that of the

Committee Members.

I just want to restate and assure you that the Administration

feels as deeply as you do, and that comes from the very top, from

President Bush himself, who was very strong on Sudan and what

is necessary to get peace there. So we will continue to work together

and I thank you.

Thank you.